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Abstract
The Treaty of Lisbon, the latest treaty governing law-making in the European Union
(EU), was ratified in 2009 and goes fully into effect in 2014. This treaty, with its change
to voting procedures in the Council of Ministers, claims to make decision-making in
the EU more democratic and more efficient. Since the EU serves as an economic and
political entity, we will assess these claims by comparing each member state’s GDP and
population to its power as modeled using the concept of a power index from the game
theory literature. We will utitlize the normalized Banzhaf index, the Shapley-Shubik
index, the position value with no assumptions about which member states are likely
to cooperate, and the position value under the assumption that Germany and France
have a key central role in decision-making. We will show that in general these power
indices support the claims of a more democratic and a more efficient voting process
when looking at the entire EU, but they do not support the claims when restricting the
analysis to the EU members who have adopted the euro. Finally, we add the European
Parliament to our model and show that under the Treaty of Lisbon, power is not as
evenly distributed between the Council of Miniters and the European Parliament as
one may expect at first glance.
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1 Introduction
According to the official website of the European Union (EU) (Europa 2013), the EU is a
“unique economic and political partnership between twenty-seven countries.” It has grown
from 12 member states in 1993 to 27 as of January 2013 (with Croatia expected to enter as
early as July 2013).
Everything the EU does is governed by a series of treaties, and amendment to the treaties
requires the agreement and ratification (according to their national procedures) of every
single member (Europa 2013). The two principal treaties on which the EU is based are the
Treaty on European Union (also known as the Maastricht Treaty, effective since 1993) and
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (also known as the Treaty of Rome,
effective since 1958). These two documents (plus their attached protocols and declarations)
have been amended by a long series of treaties. The latest treaty is the Treaty of Lisbon,
ratified by all EU countries before entering into force in December 2009. It will be fully in
effect by 2014 replacing several parts of the Treaty of Nice, signed into effect in February
2003.
Three main institutions are involved in EU legislation: the European Commission pro-
poses new laws, and the European Parliament (EP) and Council of the European Union,
sometimes referred to as the Council of Ministers, adopt them. The European Commision
has no formal voting power, so it will be less important for analysis in this paper. The
Council of Ministers represents the governments of the individual member states, with a
voting member per member state. Gunlicks (2011) points out that the Council of Ministers
is “not just one body of ministers; rather, it consists of various combinations of cabinet
ministers, who form subject matter councils,” such as the Economics and Financial Affairs
Council (ECOFIN) and the Foreign Affairs Council. The EP represents the EUs 500 million
citizens. Each member state of the EU is given a set number of representatives, roughly
in proportion to population, which are then elected in a national election. Members of the
European Parliament, called MEPs, are elected once every five years, with a current total of
754.
Note that the European Council, another institution of the EU, sets the overall political
direction but has no law-making power. It should not be confused with the Council of
Ministers, which along with the EP acts as the legislative branch of the EU. To avoid
confusion, we will use the name Council of Ministers rather than Council of the European
Union.
Europa (2013) summarizes the changes brought forth by the Treaty of Lisbon as well as
the need for these changes. It notes that the EU had expanded to twenty-seven member
states using rules designed for fifteen members. It cites that the Treaty of Lisbon addresses
the increased need to make the decision-making process more democratic as well as more
efficient. Towards this end, voting rules in the Council of Ministers were changed. From
2014 on, the calculation of qualified majority will be based on the double majority of member
states and people, thus representing the dual legitimacy of the Union. A double majority will
be achieved when a decision is taken by 55% of the member states representing at least 65%
of the Union‘s population. The Treaty of Nice required 50% of the members representing
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at least 62% of the population and 74% of specially assigned voting weights to agree on a
proposal for it to become law. Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon strengthens the role for
the EP by providing it with important new powers regarding EU legislation, the EU budget,
and international agreements. In particular, for the vast bulk of EU legislation, it gives the
same weight to the EP as to the Council of Ministers; each of the two bodies must approve
proposed legislation before it becomes law, which is known as the co-decision process. Also,
under the Lisbon Treaty, the maximum number of members of Parliament is set at 751; this
limit, however, will not go into effect until the next election. Since Germany will be capped
at 96 MEPs, we account for this change by reducing the number of MEP’s that represent
Germany from 99 to 96.
We will analyze the power of the member states under the formal voting rules in the
Council of Ministers with the assumption that the formal rules influence compromise and
concessions in the decision-making process, even though normally decision making in the
Council takes place behind closed doors. Often by the time the formal vote that is recorded
happens, the reported result is unanimous. VoteWatch Europe (2013) is an independent
organization that started collected data in July ’09 on how the 27 member states vote in the
Council of Ministers. They point out that, in practice, a formal vote only takes place in cases
where adoption of a proposal is guaranteed. In their 2012 annual report, they report that
of all decisions taken under the qualified majority voting rule since 2009, 65% were adopted
unanimously. Further, instead of voting against a proposed legislation, member states often
make formal statements to signal their reservations about Council decisions.
We further note that the decision-making in the European Union cannot be fully inter-
preted simply from the objective voting systems in place. Any look into the decision-making
process of the EU with an eye towards quantifying where the power lies must take into ac-
count the following three dimensions in addition to simply looking at the rules of how a law
is passed:
• Use of the euro. On January 1, 2002, the Euro replaced national currencies in 12 of
the 15 countries that at that time made up the EU. Today, 17 of the 27 EU member
states comprise the Eurozone, the collection of EU members that have adopted the
euro as their official common currency. According to Europa (2013), all members of
the EU, except Denmark and the UK, are required to adopt the euro as soon as they
meet certain conditions known as the “convergence criteria.” Denmark and the United
Kingdom obtained special opt-outs in the original Maastricht Treaty and are legally
exempt from joining the Eurozone unless their governments decide otherwise. Sweden
has thus far chosen not to make all the necessary changes to meet the convergence
criteria. The remaining members of the EU who are not in the Eurozone joined the
EU after the euro was launched and are required to work toward meeting the necessary
criteria. Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon formalized the following policy: when the
full ECOFIN council votes on matters only affecting the Eurozone, only those states
using the euro are permitted to vote on it. In this case, according to Article 205 (3)
(a) of the Treaty, a qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55% of the members
of the Council representing the participating Member States, comprising at least 65%
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of the population of these States. Note: The monetary policy of all countries in the
Eurozone is managed by the Eurosystem which comprises the the European Central
Bank (ECB) and the central banks of the EU states who have joined the euro zone.
Countries outside the Eurozone are not represented in these institutions.
• Views on full integration of the EU. As expressed by Gunlicks (2011,45), “[T]he wish
of some leaders and citizens in Europe to see the EU evolve into a more democratic
federal state, which they see as the logical conclusion of ever closer union, is vehemently
opposed by other leaders and Euroskeptics in general.” The three largest members
of the EU each have different views on integration. The Federalist view, held by
Germany, envisions deeper integration of the member states, with a central decision-
making authority in some well-defined areas separate from the member nations and
decisions in these areas made by central institutions. The Nationalist view, held by
the UK, states that the EU should function as an informal co-operative union and that
national government representatives should make important European decisions. The
Functionalist view, led by France, is somewhere between the other two opposing views.
• Traditional political parties. Though the European Parliament assigns votes to each
Member State by population, the MEPs in Parliament are grouped by political af-
filiation. Once elected, MEPs organize along political lines, and not by nationality.
Currently Europa (2013) lists seven political parties represented in the EP.
Taking each of these into account, we first analyze the power of each member state in
the Council of Ministers, using three different power indices, to see how (if at all) the power
shifts in the move to the new rules in the Treaty of Lisbon. Our analysis will argue that
following the shift in power, decision-making is more efficient. In order to assess the claim
of fairer distribution of power, we need to clarify how we interpret fairness. Fairness is
two-fold: whether an individual member state is justly represented given its contribution to
the EU in terms of population and Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and whether there is a
balance of under-representation and over-representation across the entire EU. We will analyze
fairness by calculating relevant power indices and then computing ratios comparing GDP to
power and population to power. From this power analysis we will address how well the EU
represents its member states economically and politically, since it is formally described as
an “economic and political partnership.” Since on matters pertaining to the euro, only the
ministers from the member states whose currency is the euro can vote, we redo this analysis
of power specifically for the Eurozone countries. We then add in the European Parliament,
given its more equal role in the Treaty of Lisbon, and consider the distribution of power
between the EP and the Council of Ministers. To perform this analysis, we will need to
introduce mathematical tools, particularly from game theory, and apply these mathematical
tools to the voting processes in each respective law-making body.
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2 Mathematics Background
A game, (N, v), in characteristic form, is a finite set N = {1, 2, ..., n} of players along with
a real-valued set function v : 2N → <, defined for all subsets S ⊆ N with v(∅) = 0. A subset
of players is called a coalition. A simple game is a game in which v(S) is either 0 or 1;
in this case a coalition is thought of as either winning or losing. Simple games are used to
model voting situations; the game describes which groups of voters can assure the passage of
a proposition by all voting yes regardless of how the other voters vote. A weighted voting
game [q;w1, w2, ...wn] with quota q and player weights wi (0 ≤ wi < q for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) is a
simple game (N, v) defined by v(S) = 1 if
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q and v(S) = 0 otherwise.
The intersection game v = v1∧v2∧...∧vk, is defined by v(S) = min{v1(S), v2(S), ...vk(S)}.
A weighted m-majority voting game is the intersection game of m weighted voting games. It
is the simple game (N, v1 ∧ v2 ∧ ... ∧ vm) where the games (N, vt) are the weighted voting
games represented by [qt;wt1, w
t
2, ...w
t
n] for 1 ≤ t ≤ m. The characterstic function is given by
v1 ∧ v2 ∧ ... ∧ vm(S) = 1 if wt(S) ≥ qt for all t; and 0 otherwise. In other words, a coalition
S must reach the quota in each individual game in order to be a winning coalition.
For example, for the Council of Ministers in the European Union, each criteria for a
proposition to pass can be thought of as a weighted voting game. In the Treaty of Nice, for a
propositon to pass, all three of the following criteria must be met: 1) a 62 percent majority of
the population votes yes, 2) a majority of all 27 countries must vote yes, and 3) a 74 percent
majority of voting weights vote yes. Each of these criteria can be thought of as a weighted
voting game where v1 = [620; 163, 129, ...1], v2 = [14; 1, 1, ...1], and v3 = [255; 29, 29, ...3] as
described in Section 5. Thus, the Treaty of Nice can be described as the triple-majority
weighted voting game vN = v1 ∧ v2 ∧ v3. Similarly, in the Treaty of Lisbon, for a proposition
to pass, both of the following criteria must be met: 1) a 65 percent majority of the population
votes yes and 2) a 55 percent majority of countries (or 15 countries) vote yes. Each of these
criteria can be described as v4 = [650; 163, 129, ...1] and v5 = [15; 1, 1, ...1] as described in
Section 5. Thus, the Treaty of Lisbon can be described as the double-majority weighted
voting game vL = v4 ∧ v5.
A power index is a vector-valued function Ψ(v) = (ψ1(v), ψ2(v), . . . , ψn(v)) that assigns
the real value ψi(v) to each player in the game (N, v), representing a player’s individual value
or power in the game. Some well-known examples of such an index are the Shapley-Shubik
value (Shapley and Shubik 1954) and the (normalized) Banzhaf value (for simple games)
(Banzhaf 1965). Both measure a player’s power by analyzing (in different ways) the number
of coalitions in which a player is a swing voter. A player swings in a coalition if the addition
of the player to the coalition changes its status from losing to winning. Borm et.al. (1992)
defined a different index of power that analyzes the power of voters under assumptions of
how they can (or cannot) communicate. The position value measures a voter’s power by
taking into account the voter’s ability to facilitate communication between other voters as
well as taking into account the coalitions in which the voter swings.
For S ⊆ N , on the voting game (N, v), a player i swings if v(S ∪ {i}) = 1 and v(S) = 0.
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The total number of swings for player i is given by:∑
S⊆N−{i}
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) (1)
Note that in a weighted voting game, any set S ⊆ N with i 6∈ S is a swing set for player i if
q − wi ≤ w(S) < q − 1.
For a simple game (N, v), the Shapley-Shubik value φi(v) for player i assigns a measure
of a player’s power that is proportional to the number of orderings of all the players in which
that player is pivotal : if all of the players are assigned a number from 1 to n (i.e., the players
are placed in an order), then the pivotal player is the player i for which the set of players
{1, 2, . . . , i − 1} is a losing coalition and the set of players {1, 2, . . . , i − 1, i} is a winning
coalition. The Shapley value is given by
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N−{i}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
[v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)] for s = |S| (2)
The Banzhaf value βi(v) for a simple game (N, v) is defined to be the number of swings
for player i. The normalized version β′i(v) is given by
βi∑n
i=1 βi
. The Banzhaf index assigns a
measure of a player’s power that is proportional to the number of coalitions in which that
player is a swing voter.
Owen (1995) points out that both φi(v) and βi(v) give averages of a player i’s marginal
contributions v(S ∪ {i})− v(S): βi(v) weights them all equally and φi(v) weights according
to the size of S.
In order to compute the position value, we will need to introduce a communication graph.
An undirected communication graph is a pair (N,A), where N is a set of vertices and A
is a set of arcs joining pairs of vertices. There are many types of communication graphs, but
particularly interesting for this paper are the star graph and the complete graph. A star graph
with center n is the graph with vertices N and arc set A = {{i, n}} for i = {1, 2, ...n− 1}. A
complete graph is the graph with vertices N and the arc set A = {{i, j} : ∀i, j ∈ N, i < j}.
Examples of the star graph and the complete graph on N = {1, 2, ...15} vertices are shown
in Figure 1.
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Complete Graph Star Graph 
Figure 1: Complete graph and star graph on |N | = 15 vertices
A communication situation is a triple (N, v,A), where (N, v) is a game in charac-
teristic form and (N,A) is an undirected communication graph. For convenience, we will
also assume that the underlying games (N, v) in the communication situations are zero-
normalized; i.e. v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N . In a communication situation (N, v,A), a coalition
S can obtain its economic capability v(S) only if its members cooperate; this is made difficult
by restrictions on communication among members (as represented by the graph (N,A)). For
example, if A includes the complete graph on the induced subgraph of vertices S, then the
coalition S attains its full economic capability because all players in S cooperate. In the
presence of a graph A, if the coalition S is totally disconnected, however, then it cannot
achieve its full economic capability. In our paper this will be relevant to communication
situations on the star graph. Since we are concerned with weighted voting games in the
European Union, we can utilize weighted communication situations. A weighted commu-
nication situation is a communication situation (N, v,A) on a weighted voting game with
[q;w1, w2, ...wn] where wi is the weight of player i ∈ N .
Communication situations were first studied by Myerson (1977) who focused on the role
of the vertex or player. Owen (1986) investigated further along these lines, relating power
indices of the original game to the restricted game. Borm, Owen, and Tijs (1992) first
focused on the the role of the arc in this context, which is the approach we will take.
Even if (i, j) /∈ A, players i and j may still be able to communicate via a path. In
a communication graph two vertices v1 and vk are said to be joined by a path if there is
a sequence of vertices v1, v2, . . . , vk such that vertices vi and vi+1 are joined by an arc for
i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1. A connected component of the graph is a maximal set of vertices such
that any two vertices in the set are joined by a path. A component is a maximal set of
vertices that can communicate with each other. In order to study the role of the arc in a
communication situation, Borm, et.al. (1992) defined the arc game, a new game defined
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Figure 2: Example of a Communication Graph
from the communication situation in which the “players” become the arcs. The arc game
(A, vA) is defined in coalition form as follows:
vA(T ) =
∑
Ci∈C(T )
v(Ci)
where T ⊆ A and C(T ) is the set of connected components of the induced subgraph (N, T ).
Communication situations, in the case of a simple game, model voting situations in which
communication among the voters is restricted. For example, let G be the graph shown in
Figure 2 (arcs are labeled by letters and players are labeled with numbers) and let v be
the majority-rules game on five players (any group of three or more players wins). Then
vA({a, b}) = v({1, 2, 3}) + v({4}) + v({5}) = 1 + 0 + 0 = 1 and vA({a, c}) = v({1, 2}) +
v({3, 4}) + v({5}) = 0 + 0 + 0 = 0. Notice that without arcs c or e, players 4 and 5 cannot
communicate with player 3. Also, for example, player 1 can only communicate with player
2, and in effect any of the other players, with the inclusion of arc a.
With an arc game, the arcs are the “players,” so that a power index like the Shapley value
for the arc game measures the value of each arc. Using this interpretation, for the arc game
(A, vA), the Shapley value φi(v
A) for arc a is computed by summing over the permutations
of the swings sets for arc a:∑
T⊆A−{a}
|T |!(|A| − |T | − 1)!
|A|! [v(A ∪ {a})− v(A)] (3)
The position value, defined by Borm, et.al. (1992), translates these arc values into
values for the original players N . Let Ai be the set of all arcs incident with vertex i.
Then the position value (pi1(v), pi2(v), . . . , pin(v)) for the communication situation (N, v,A)
is defined
pii(v) =
1
2
∑
a∈Ai
φa(v
A) (4)
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where φa(v
A) is the Shapley value of arc a in the arc game (A, vA). The position value takes
into account both a player’s power in the original game (N, v) and a player’s location in the
graph (N,A).
Borm, et.al. (1992) characterize the position value in the case that the underlying graph
(N,A) has no cycles. Hoke and Noonan (1997) compute the position values of the Canadian
provinces in the Constitutional amendment game using a graph representing the geographic
location of the provinces (and containing one simple cycle). Borm, et.al. (1992) point out
that if the underlying graph is the complete graph (i.e., A contains all possible pairs of
vertices in N), then technically no restrictions on communication exist, and the position
value becomes a measure of power on the original game. It can be compared to other power
indices such as the Shapley and the Banzhaf.
According to Straffin (1993), the Banzhaf index is most appropriate when the voters act
independently and the Shapley-Shubik is most appropriate when the voters act according
to some common criteria. Both measure the power of a player using the number of sets in
which the player swings. The position value allows us to also look at communication between
the players. It is a power measure that credits a player’s ability to facilitate communication
between “valuable” players as well as the player’s ability to add value to a coalition. For
our paper, we utilize the Shapley-Shubik index, the normalized Banzhaf index, the position
value on the star graph, and the position value on the complete graph. To more easily
calculate these values for the European Union, we take advantage of useful techniques that
are outlined in the next two sections.
3 The Multilinear Extension, Unanimity Games, and
Generating Functions for an Intersection of Games
For this paper, we will utilize the multilinear extension (MLE) to compute the Banzhaf and
Shapley values, as well as the position value. The multilinear extension of v on an n-person
game is the function f defined as follows:
f(x1, x2, ...xn) =
∑
S⊆N
{
∏
i∈S
xi
∏
i 6∈S
(1− xi)}v(S)
=
∑
S⊆N
∆S(
∏
i∈S
xi) (5)
where ∆S =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)|S|−|T |v(T ).
Theorem 1 (Owen 1995) Let (N, v) be a game where N = {1, 2, ..., n}. Let fi = ∂∂xif be
the ith partial derivative of the MLE f(x1, x2, ..., xn). Setting (x1, x2, ..., xn) = (t, t, ...t) and
integrating from 0 to 1, we obtain the Shapley value for player i:∫ 1
0
fi(t, t, ...t)dt = φi(v) (6)
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We introduce the function g which will turn out to be a convenient function written in terms
of all of the winning coalitions. Let g be the function
g(x1, x2, ...xn) =
∑
S⊆N
(
∏
j∈S
xj)v(S) =
∑
winning
S
∏
j∈S
xj (7)
Note that g(1,1,...1) is the total number of winning coalitions.
We also introduce gi as a convenient function written in terms of all of the swing coalitions
for player i:
gi(x1, x2, ...xn) =
∑
S⊆N−{i}
(
∏
j∈S
xj)[v(S ∪ i)− v(S)] (8)
=
∑
swings
S
∏
j∈S
xj
We can directly calculate the non-normalized Banzhaf value for a player i with gi(x1, x2, ...xn):
βi(v) = gi(1, 1, ...1) (9)
More importantly, (1 − t)n−1gi( t1−t , t1−t , ..., t1−t) = fi(t, t, ...t). Using this result, we can
use gi to calculate the Shapley value:
φi(v) =
∫ 1
0
fi(t, t, ...t)dt =
∫ 1
0
(1− t)n−1gi( t
1− t ,
t
1− t , ...,
t
1− t)dt. (10)
We use the functions g and gi to calculate the Banzhaf value and Shapley-Shubik value
when the game is a weighted m-majority voting game because we can use generating functions
(as introduced by Mann and Shapley (1962)) to easily find g and gi.
For a single weighted voting game and player i, we use the generating function∏
j 6=i
(1 + xywj) (11)
where x is a counter for the size of the set and wj is the weight of player j ∈ N − {i}.
Our generating function can also be written as:∏
j 6=i
(1 + xywj) =
∑
j
∑
k
cjkx
jyk (12)
where cjk is the number of subsets S ⊆ N of size j and weight k. Summing only the
swings of our generating function, we find that our generating function relates back to gi:
12
gi(t, t, ...t) =
∑
swings
S
ts =
∑
j
q−1∑
k=q−wi
cjkt
j (13)
For a double majority weighted game v1 ∧ v2 where v1 = [q1;w(1)1 , w(1)2 , ..., w(1)n ] and v2 =
[q2;w
(2)
1 , w
(2)
2 , ..., w
(2)
n ], for player i we use our generating function and find
gi(t, t, ...t) =
∑
swings
S
ts =
∑
j
q1−1∑
k=q1−w(1)i
q2−1∑
l=q2−w(2)i
cjklt
j (14)
where cjkl is the number of subsets S ⊆ N of size j and weights k, l from v1, v2 respectively.
For an m-majority weighted voting game v1 ∧ v2 ∧ ... ∧ vm where [qt;wt1, wt2, ...wtn] for
1 ≤ t ≤ m, for player i we use our generating function to find
gi(t, t, ...t) =
∑
swings
S
ts =
∑
j
q1−1∑
k=q1−w(1)i
q2−1∑
l=q2−w(2)i
...
qm−1∑
p=qm−w(m)i
cjkl...pt
j (15)
Using the above equation, we can calculate the Banzhaf value and Shapley value for an m-
majority weighted voting game. This methodology will be especially useful for programming
since a computer can easily compute a generating function. Specifically, this methodology
will help to calculate power indices for the Council of Ministers under the Treaty of Nice
and the Treaty of Lisbon where vN = v1 ∧ v2 ∧ v3 and vL = v4 ∧ v5.
We also use the multilinear extension to compute the position value. For this, we will
need unanimity games µS defined for all S ⊆ N with S 6= ∅ as follows:
µS(T ) =
{
1 if S ⊆ T
0 otherwise
The set of unanimity games µS for S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, forms a basis for the set of games (cf. Owen
(1995)); any game (N, v) can be written (uniquely) in terms of these games: v =
∑
S⊆N
S 6=∅
∆SµS,
where ∆S =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)|S|−|T |v(T ), the coefficients from the multilinear extension.
Theorem 2 (Hoke 2012) If f(x1, x2, ...xn) =
∑
S⊆N ∆S
∏
j∈S xj is the MLE for the game
(N,v) and the arc game vA =
∑
S⊆N
S 6=∅
∆Sµ
A
S , then the position value pii(v) =
∑
S⊆N ∆Spii(µS).
Thus, it is possible to compute the position values for any game from the position values
on the unanimity games using the multilinear extension.
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4 Computing the Position Value with the Underlying
Graph as Star or Complete
The first graph on which we compute the position value is the star graph, which may be the
easiest graph since we can compute the Shapley value using only v = [q;w1, w2, ...wn] with
player n being the center player.
Theorem 3 In a weighted communication situation (N, v,A) on a star graph with center n,
the position value for player j ∈ N −{n} is 1
2
φj(v
′) where φj(v′) is the Shapley value for the
weighted majority game v′ = [q−wn;w1, w2, ..wn−1] on the player set N −{n}. The position
value for player n is 1
2
.
Proof: Let (N, v,A) be a weighted communication situation on a star graph with center
player n. By definition, for a player i ∈ N in a communication situation, pii = 12
∑
a∈Ai φa(v
A).
For all T ⊆ A, on the star graph, there is a unique connected component CT with more
than one vertex in the induced subgraph (N, T ) because every arc includes n. Thus,
vA(T ) =
∑
Ci∈C(T ) v(Ci) = v(CT ) = v(n, j1, j2, ...jk) where jk ∈ N − {n} and jk ∈ CT .
For player jk, v(n, j1, j2, ...jk) = v
′(j1, j2, ...jk) where v′ = [q − wn;w1, w2, ..wn−1] on the
player set N −{n}. Therefore, since each player j ∈ N −{n} is in a distinct arc aj = {j, n}
on the star graph, pij =
1
2
∑
j∈a φa(v
A) = 1
2
φaj(v
A) = 1
2
φj(v
′) where φj(v′) is the Shapley
value on the game v′. Since player n is in every arc, the position value for player n will be
1
2
∑
n∈A φa =
1
2
.
Unfortunately, computing the position value for most graphs requires the use of the MLE,
which makes the problem more computationally difficult. Computing the MLE reqiures on
the order of 2n calculations because the MLE is computed by looking at every subset of
the player set. Thus, for large games 2n calculations becomes difficult; particularly, we
find computing the MLE infeasible for player sets that are larger than approximately 22
players. However, with the complete graph, we can take advantage of symmetries and use
f(t, t, ...t) and fi(t, t, ...t) rather than the full MLE f(x1, x2, ...xn). Further, these functions
can be easily computed for weighted majority games by utilizing our functions g(t, t, ...t) and
gi(t, t, ...t).
By symmetry of the position value on the complete graph, there are only two different
position values for the game (N,µS): pii(µS) when i ∈ S which is denoted piin(µS) and pii(µS)
when i /∈ S which is denoted piout(µS). Further, we only need to find pii(µk) for k = |S|. Now
we show how fi(t, t, ...t) can be used rather than the full MLE in the case of the complete
graph. Using Theorem 2,
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pii(v) = pii(
∑
S⊆N
∆SµS) (16)
=
∑
S⊆N
∆Spii(µS) (17)
=
∑
S⊆N
i∈S
∆Spii(µS) +
∑
S⊆N
i 6∈S
∆Spii(µS) (18)
=
n∑
k=1
∑
S⊆N
i∈S
k=|S|
∆Spii(µS) +
n−1∑
k=1
∑
S⊆N
i 6∈S
k=|S|
∆Spii(µS) (19)
=
n∑
k=1
ckpiin,k(µk) +
n−1∑
k=1
dkpiout,k(µk) (20)
We only need to compute the coefficients ck, dk for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, which we can do without
computing all 2n ∆S with our earlier work. From the MLE, the coefficient of t
k in f(t, t, t...t)
will give us the coefficient for µk for k = |S|. However, by simply substituting t into the
MLE, we lose being able to distinguish whether i ∈ S, which is important for computing the
position value on the complete graph. For a given player i, think of our MLE as the sum of
two pieces. From (6),
f(x1, x2, ...xn) =
∑
S⊆N
∆S(
∏
j∈S
xj) =
∑
S⊆N
i∈S
∆S(
∏
j∈S
xj) +
∑
S⊆N
i/∈S
∆S(
∏
j∈S
xj) (21)
= f(x1, x2, ...xn)in + f(x1, x2, ...xn)out (22)
Note that f(x1, x2, ...xn) = xi · fi(x1, x2, ...xn), and therefore f(t, t, ...t) = t · fi(t, t, ...t).
Notice that we can use the work from earlier in the paper to see that t · fi(t, t, ...t) =
t · (1− t)n−1gi( t1−t , t1−t , ..., t1−t) to make using the MLE to compute the position value much
easier on weighted voting games. Now that we have one piece, we need to find fout, which
can be found from above where f(t, t, ...t)out = f(t, t, ...t) − t · f(t, t, ...t)in. Notice that
again we can use the work from earlier to find f(t, t, ...t) from g. Substituting t
1−t into g(x),
(1− t)ng( t
1−t ,
t
1−t , ...
t
1−t) = f(t, t, ...t). Therefore, we see that for a given player i:
f(t, t, ...t)in = t · fi(t, t, ...t) (23)
and
f(t, t, ...t)out = f(t, t, ...t)− t · fi(t, t, ...t) (24)
We want to find the coefficients on the unaniminity games µin,k and µout,k since v =∑n
k=1 ckµin,k +
∑n−1
k=1 dkµout,k. In order to find ck and dk we use our two pieces of the MLE
as generating functions:
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f(t, t, ...t)in =
n∑
k=1
ckt
k (25)
and
f(t, t, ...t)out =
n−1∑
k=1
dkt
k (26)
where k = |S| so that the exponent t gives us k in the unanimity game µk. Notice that
our MLE gives us the coefficients for the vertex unanimity games µk, which allows us to find
pii(µk).
For a given weighted voting game, recall that we compute fi(t, t, ...t) from gi(t, t, ...t) using
generating functions in order to compute the Banzhaf and Shapley values. Our methodology
only changes slightly now because we need to keep track of whether a player i ∈ S or i /∈ S.
We wrote a computer program to compute the position value after inputting the values of
pii(µk) as described in Hoke (2012). This program is presented in the appendix.
5 Calculating Power Indices for the Council of Minis-
ters and the Eurogroup
To calculate each power index will require applying the mathematical tools established earlier
in the paper. Importantly, each power index requires a set of weights as well as a quota (since
these are all weighted voting games). Each law-making body has its own rules for a measure
to pass, which must be highlighted in order to calculate each power index. The position
value on the complete graph power requires an additional table for unanimity games, which
is difficult to generate for games with a large player set; thus for games with more than
twenty players, the position value on the complete graph is excluded.
To calculate each of these power indices we will use the function gi as defined in (8),
which will change for each different voting body, to find all of the swing sets in a given
game. This will directly give us the non-normalized Banzhaf value for a given player i. As
noted earlier, we can manipulate gi to calculate the Shapley value for a given player i since
(1−t)n−1gi( t1−t , t1−t , ..., t1−t) = ∂∂if(t, t, ...t). As shown in Theorem 3, to calculate the position
value on the star graph, we simply calculate the Shapley value on a new game where we
subtract the weights of the players in the center from the quota and remove their weights
from the game. We need to divide these Shapley values by 2 since the players in the center
split 50% of the power. Finally, we utilize fi(t, t, ...t) that we used in computing the Shapley
value. We utilize the coefficients that correspond to the unanimity games of size k that fully
exclude the coalition of players and those that do not fully inlude the subset of players, as
generated in our table previously.
Pseudocode has also been provided in Appendix A to help readers follow the methodol-
ogy more easily.
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5.1 Council of Ministers
As noted in the preliminaries, for the Council of Ministers in the European Union, each
criteria for a proposition to pass can be thought of as a weighted voting game. Thus, the
Treaty of Nice can be described as the triple-majority weighted voting game vN = v1∧v2∧v3
where
v1 = {620; 163, 129, 124, 121, 92, 77, 43, 33, 23, 22, 21, 21, 20, 19, 17, 15,
11, 11, 11, 9, 6, 4, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1}
v2 = {14; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
v3 = {255; 29, 29, 29, 29, 27, 27, 14, 13, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 10, 10, 10, 7, 7,
7, 7, 7, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3}
(27)
Similarly, the Treaty of Lisbon can be described as the double-majority weighted voting
game vL = v4 ∧ v5 where
v4 = {650; 163, 129, 124, 121, 92, 77, 43, 33, 23, 22, 21, 21, 20, 19, 17, 15,
11, 11, 11, 9, 6, 4, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1}
v5 = {15; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
(28)
The games v1 and v4 model the population criteria: 65% of the EU population must
approve a measure under the Treaty of Nice and 65% under the Treaty of Lisbon. The
games v2 and v5 model the “number of member states” criteria: 50% of member states
must approve under the Treaty of Nice and 55% under the Treaty of Lisbon. Note that the
population weights we are using do not sum exactly to 1000 because the percentages were
rounded to the nearest .1%.
Recall that gi(t, t, ...t) is a polynomial that represents all of the swing sets for a given
player i. Let g
(Nice)
i (t, t, ...t) represent the swing sets for the Treaty of Nice for a player i,
which is derived from the triple intersection of v1, v2, and v3. Let g
(Lis)
i (t, t, ...t) represent
the swing sets for the Treaty of Lisbon for a player i, which is derived from the double
intersection fo v4 and v5. From here we can calculate the non-normalized Banzhaf values
and the Shapley values for the Treaty of Nice where
β
(Nice)
i = g
(Nice)
i (1, 1, ...1) (29)
and (30)
φ
(Nice)
i =
∫ 1
0
(1− t)N−1g(Nice)i (
t
1− t ,
t
1− t , ...
t
1− t)dt (31)
We can also calculate the Banzhaf and Shapley Values for the Treaty of Lisbon where
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β
(Lis)
i = g
(Lis)
i (1, 1, ...1) (32)
and (33)
φ
(Lis)
i =
∫ 1
0
(1− t)N−1g(Lis)i (
t
1− t ,
t
1− t , ...
t
1− t)dt (34)
To compute the position value for the star, we must slightly adjust our voting games since
we are omitting the weights of the players from the center and then subtract their weights
from the quota. Thus, we will compute the Shapley value for each player i that is not in
the center from v∗1, v
∗
2, and v
∗
3 under the Treaty of Nice and v
∗
4 and v
∗
5 under the Treaty of
Lisbon such that
v∗1 = {328; 124, 121, 92, 77, 43, 33, 23, 22, 21, 21, 20, 19, 17, 15, 11, 11, 11, 9, 6, 4, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1}
v∗2 = {12; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
v∗3 = {197; 29, 29, 27, 27, 14, 13, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 10, 10, 10, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3}
v∗4 = {358; 124, 121, 92, 77, 43, 33, 23, 22, 21, 21, 20, 19, 17, 15, 11, 11, 11, 9, 6, 4, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1}
v∗5 = {13; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
From here, the position value for each player not in the center is half. Germany and
France as central players will receive 25% each.
The results for the power indices in the Council of Ministers are presented in Appendix C.
5.2 Eurogroup
Computing each power index for the Eurogroup will be the same as in the Council of Ministers
except that we use a specific subset of 17 players for our player set. Note, that we calculate
population percentages as a percentage of the Eurogroup, not as a percentage of the EU, so
the weights in v1 and v4 will change. Also, the quotas for the other games will change. To
find gi to compute the Shapley and Banzhaf values, we use the following games similarly to
our methodology for the Council of Ministers in Section 5.1
v1 = {620; 246, 196, 183, 139, 50, 34, 33, 32, 25, 16, 16, 14, 6, 4, 3, 2, 1}
v2 = {9; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
v3 = {158; 29, 29, 29, 27, 13, 12, 12, 12, 10, 7, 7, 7, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3}
v4 = {650; 246, 196, 183, 139, 50, 34, 33, 32, 25, 16, 16, 14, 6, 4, 3, 2, 1}
v5 = {10; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
(35)
For the star graph, we repeat what we did in the Council of Ministers, only using the
games listed directly above so that
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v∗1 = {620; 246, 196, 183, 139, 50, 34, 33, 32, 25, 16, 16, 14, 6, 4, 3, 2, 1}
v∗2 = {9; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
v∗3 = {158; 29, 29, 29, 27, 13, 12, 12, 12, 10, 7, 7, 7, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3}
v∗4 = {650; 246, 196, 183, 139, 50, 34, 33, 32, 25, 16, 16, 14, 6, 4, 3, 2, 1}
v∗5 = {10; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
(36)
For the complete graph, we will need to use gi(x) as computed for the Shapley and
Banzhaf values using v1, v2, v3, v4, and v5. We will create fin(t, t, ...t) by generating fi(t, t, ...t)
and multiplying by t. We will create fout(t, t, ...t) by generating f(t, t, ...t) and subtracting
fin(t, t, ...t). For each player i, we will use the arc unanimity game position values from the
table below:
size s In Out
1 0 0
2 0.208902 0.038813
3 0.145221 0.04031
4 0.120672 0.039793
5 0.106236 0.039068
6 0.096304 0.03838
7 0.088904 0.037767
8 0.083117 0.037229
9 0.078438 0.036757
10 0.074561 0.036341
11 0.071288 0.035973
12 0.068482 0.035644
13 0.066047 0.035349
14 0.063911 0.035083
15 0.062021 0.034842
16 0.060336 0.034622
17 1/17 1/17
Figure 3: Unanimity Table
The results for the power indices in the Eurogroup are presented in Appendix C.
6 Analysis of Fairness and Efficiency in the Council
of Ministers
Since the EU was created in part to promote economic growth, GDP should be an important
determinant of power for its member states. Further, in order to maintain stability the EU
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also serves as a political institution that maintains the interests of all those it oversees
– making population an important factor in determining power in decision-making. To
analyze power distribution, we will use four power indices: the normalized Banzhaf index,
the Shapley-Shubik index, the position value on the star graph, and the position value on
the complete graph. Every power index shows that voting power is not distributed evenly
across member states, which seems reasonable given the diversity in population and GDP. In
both the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon, the voting procedures are designed so that
population directly determines a member state’s power through weights, whereas GDP is
not a direct determinant. Since a member state’s swing sets are determined by the member
state’s weights, when the member states are ranked by population they are also ranked by
power. The same does not necessarily hold for GDP, although the ranking is approximately
correct as GDP is strongly correlated to population. Within the European Union, GDP and
population across member states have a correlation coefficient of .959, which is very close to
1.0. This coefficient was calculated using data in Appendix B.
A reasonable topic for analysis for the legislative bodies in the European Union is fair-
ness. As noted earlier, fairness is two-fold: whether an individual member state is justly
represented given its contribution to the EU in terms of percentage of GDP and percentage of
population, and whether there is a balance of under-representation and over-representation
across the entire EU. We will analyze fairness by calculating relevant power indices and then
computing ratios comparing GDP to power and population to power. The ratio for GDP
to power will be calculated by dividing each member state’s percentage of EU GDP by the
member state’s percentage of power from the power index. The ratio for population will
be calculated by dividing each member state’s percentage of EU population by the member
state’s percentage of power from the power index. A ratio of 1.0 will be the desirable bench-
mark because this means that a member state’s percentage of total population or GDP is
the same as its percentage of power, which is an indication of a fair representation. Note,
that a ratio above 1.0 means a member state is under-represented, whereas a ratio below
1.0 means a member state is over-represented, which may seem counter-intuitive to some
readers. Specifically, we will use the following metrics to assess fairness:
• Mean. Since a ratio of 1.0 represents the fairness benchmark, power is distributed
more fairly (in the sense of balance of under-representation and over-representation
across all member states) if the mean of all ratios is close to 1.0. In both the Council
of Ministers and the Eurogroup, the mean will generally be less than 1.0, meaning that
an increase in the mean from Nice to Lisbon is desirable.
• Standard Deviation. More dispersion means that representation is less consistent
across member states. In other words, a lower standard deviation supports a fairer
distribution of power. Note that we need to be careful when using the standard de-
viation because we are most interested in dispersion about the 1.0 standard, whereas
the standard deviation measures dispersion about the mean; in many cases the mean
is not 1.0.
• Skewness. Symmetry shows a more fair distribution of power in balancing between
20
under-represented (ratio greater than 1.0) and over-represented (ratio lower than 1.0)
member states. Using histograms, we analyze skewness by looking at the number of
member states above and below the 1.0 standard. If relatively many member states
are either over- or under-represented, then we conclude that power is distributed less
fairly.
• Bias in Power Distribution. If a member state has a characteristic that makes it
more likely to be either over- or under- represented then power is not distributed fairly.
For example, if member states with a large population are always under-represented,
this would be an unfair distribution of power.
• Further Under-representation. Member states that are under-represented (ra-
tio greater than 1.0) may notice an increase in their ratio. Since an already under-
represented member state becomes even more under-represented, we deem this an
unfair transition of power. More intuitively, if a member state’s representation was un-
favorable under Nice, it would be unfair for it to have an even more unfavorable repre-
sentation under Lisbon. Note that we could also interpret a further over-representation
as an unfair transition of power. However, as we will see in the analysis, the results are
often skewed towards much fewer under-represented countries, which makes focusing
on further under-representation more interesting.
In addition to these standard metrics, we will use the Gini Index as a summary statistic
to provide a more aggregrate portrayal of fairness. A good description of the Gini Index,
including its origins, can be found in Farris (2010). The Gini Index is most often used to
measure how equitably (or inequitably) income is distributed in a population by using a
Lorenz curve. The Lorenz curve orders the population in increasing order of income such
that the first cumulative P% of the population represent the poorest P%, and the last
cumulative P% represent the richest P%. For the poorest P% of the population, we define
the Lorenze curve to be L(P ) such that L represents the percentage of income that the
P% holds. In “perfect equitability,” L(P ) = P so that every member of the population
has the same income. An example of a Lorenze Curve is offered in Figure 4. The Gini
Index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and “perfect equitability” to measure the
equitability of income distribution in a population, which can be shown as area A in Figure
4. In practice, this area is doubled so that the index ranges between 0 and 1. Since our
analysis is concerned with equity in power distribution relative to popoulation and GDP, we
analogously treat income as power under each index and we treat population as population
percentage, or GDP percentage. Note that the closer the Gini Index is to 1, the less fairly
power is distributed; the closer the Gini Index is to 0, the more fairly power is distributed.
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Figure 4: Example of Lorenz Curve
source by: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Economics_Gini_coefficient.svg
To compute the Gini Index, we first order the member states by the power index and
then by population percentage (to break ties). We then compute the cumulative population
Pi =
∑i
k=1 pi for each member state (where pi is the percent of the EU population for
member state i), and the cumulative power index Li =
∑i
k=1 li, where li is the value of the
power index for member state i. Notice that in the special case of the European Union,
since each power index is directly determined by population percentage within the weighted
voting games, the orderings of power in each index will always follow the same ordering
as population percentage (assuming population percentage breaks ties). Thus, for each
power index, when ordering to calculate the Gini Index for the EU, we can simply order
by population percentage. The formula for estimating the area B under the Lorenz curve
(using trapezoids) as described in Figure 4 is given by
1
2
N∑
i=1
(Pi − Pi−1) · (Li + Li−1) (37)
where P0 = L0 = 0. Since we are interested in the area between the Lorenz curve and
the curve L(P ) = P , we use this area to calculate the Gini Index. In the customary problem
of income distribution, the Lorenz curve always lies below L(P ) = P ; however, this may not
necessarily be the case in our problem. In the case of income distribution, the Gini Index is
2(1
2
− B) since the area between the curve L(P ) = P for 0 ≤ P ≤ 1 is 1
2
. In the case where
the Lorenz curve lies above L(P ) = P , the Gini Index is 2(B − 1
2
). Unfortunately, there
may also be the case where the Lorenz curve lies both above and below L(P ) = P . For our
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analysis, we will use the net difference in area above and below L(P ) = P , so that the Gini
Index is |2(1
2
−B)|. We compute the Gini Index for each power index relative to population
percentage and GDP percentage. When using GDP, Pi is the cumulative GDP, rather than
the cumulative population.
Another reasonable analysis will be efficiency. The Treaty of Lisbon states that one
of its goals is to increase efficiency of lawmaking. This may be simply referring to ease of
counting votes by moving from a triple qualified majority voting system to a double qualified
majority voting system. We hope to provide further insight into other areas of efficiency that
result from the Treaty of Lisbon. Specifically, we will show that there are now more winning
coalitions, making it easier for a vote to pass, and the minimum power required for a vote
to pass decreases from the earlier to the later treaty. We will analyze law-making bodies of
the Council of Ministers and the Eurogroup. For simplicity and brevity, below we will refer
to the Treaties of Nice and Lisbon simply as “Nice” and “Lisbon.”
6.1 Fairness in the Council of Ministers
Looking at the GDP/Shapley ratios in the Treaty of Nice, we notice immediately that Ger-
many and France have the highest ratios, meaning that they are the most under-represented
countries in the EU. This is especially interesting because they are the two counties with the
highest GDP. In contrast, most of the countries with low GDP also have low ratios. Fur-
thermore, we notice that only a handful of countries meet the 1.0 standard with the mean
ratio of .68. In addition to few member states meeting the 1.0 standard, the distribution of
favorable and unfavorable ratios is sporadic with a standard deviation of .60. In general, it
seems that the Treaty of Nice distributes power unfavorably to countries with high GDP, but
favorably to countries with low GDP. One country to note is Luxembourg, however, where
relative to other countries with low GDP, its ratio is high.
Figure 5: Council of Ministers, Shapley, GDP
Moving from Nice to Lisbon, the GDP/Shapley ratio tells a different story. The mean of
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the ratios increases to .73, meaning that on average a country’s power more closely matches
its GDP contribution. The standard deviation of the ratios decreases as well, meaning that
the countries as a whole are more concentrated near the center. Similarly, the ratios are less
skewed, as there are several more countries above the 1.0 standard and significantly less with
ratios less than .5. Furthermore, the ratios for high GDP countries decrease and the ratios for
low GDP countries increase, which is seen by the range of ratios decreasing from 2.5 to 1.75.
In general, the Treaty of Lisbon seems fairer to countries with high GDP and low GDP and
better balances the distribution of power throughout the entire EU. Note that countries with
high GDP relative to their population are treated unfavorably (and arguably unfairly) in the
transition from Nice to Lisbon – notably Denmark, Netherlands, and Sweden who are all
above 1.0 but still notice their ratios increasing. In other words, they were under-represented
under Nice and become more under-represented under Lisbon.
Figure 6: Council of Ministers, Shapley, Population
As noted earlier, GDP and population are closely related, so not surpringly the graphs
for the ratios of population/GDP look similar to those with GDP. However, as population is
more directly related to the voting games in Nice and Lisbon, the distribution of the ratios
more closely reflects fairness in power distribution. Under the Treaty of Nice, the mean of
the ratios is .70 with a standard deviation of .441. Similar to with GDP, however, only a
handful of countries meet 1.0. According to the Treaty of Lisbon, the graph looks fairer
than in Nice, with mean of .77 and standard deviation of .327. Also, many of the countries
have ratios close to 1.0. As with GDP, the transition from Nice to Lisbon seems much fairer
in its distribution of power relative to population. Although Denmark, Netherlands, and
Sweden notice their ratios rising, they did not have ratios above 1.0 in Nice so the increase
is more justified. In fact, none of the countries that had a ratio above 1.0 under Nice notice
an increase in their ratio under Lisbon.
The Banzhaf ratios, in general, have a lower mean and a lower standard deviation. Thus,
the Banzhaf ratios show a slightly less optimistic view toward the fairness of the distribution
of power in the European Union. Further, it shows a less dramatic shift in mean and standard
deviation compared to Shapley.
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Also, when looking at the histograms for GDP/Banzhaf, the shifts in power to do not
seem quite as dramatic as with the Shapley value. Nine countries still remain below the
.25 ratio and the general trend shows much fewer above the 1.0 line than below it. In fact,
the mean actually decreases. However, similar to the Shapley value, the range of ratios
decreases, and the standard deviation decreases significantly. The high GDP countries are
better represented and notice a decrease in their GDP/Banzhaf ratios. Now, Netherlands
and Spain seem to be treated unfairly as their ratios increase even though their ratios were
above 1.0 under Nice.
Figure 7: Council of Ministers, Banzhaf, GDP
For population, we notice that the range of ratios decreases and their spread decreases
with the standard deviation decreasing. The large countries all become better represented.
However, the histograms show that the number of countries above 1.0 remains at 7 and two
more countries have ratios below .25. Poland and Spain notably notice an increase in their
ratio even with ratios above 1.0 under Nice.
Figure 8: Council of Ministers, Banzhaf, Population
By using the position value with the star graph as a measure of power, we assume that
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the center controls communication. In other words, a country outside the center cannot
communicate with another country without going through the center. Another way to look
at this is that a coalition cannot win without the players in the center. It is not unrealistic to
assume that approval cannot be obtained without the support of both Germany and France.
Further, as proven earlier in the paper, the position value on the star graph is simply a
special case of Shapley value analysis after removing players in the center. Taking the power
of the central players for granted and redoing the analysis for the other countries without
their influence should give different insight into the dynamics of the voting system.
The mean of the GDP ratio for the star graph is much higher than that of the Banzhaf
and Shapley indices—in fact it is right at 1.0. However, the standard deviation is also much
higher at over .7. Further, in the transition from Nice to Lisbon, the standard deviation
increases. Compared to Banzhaf and Shapley, the histograms do not show dramatic changes
in the shape of the distribution. Also looking at the histograms, many of the countries
with ratios above 1.0 notice their ratios increasing. With Germany and France “removed”
from the game, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are the most under-represented
countries with ratios above 2.0 in both Nice and Lisbon.
Figure 9: Council of Ministers, Star, GDP
The population ratios, on the other hand, seem to depict a completely different story.
In Nice, the distribution appears almost normal, with most of the countries near the center
and much less away form the center. Under Lisbon it appears almost uniform with an equal
distribution at the center and away from the center. Even though the mean is again very
close to 1.0, the standard deviation is much less and closer to that of Shapley and Banzhaf.
Countries that notice an ”unfair” increase in power include: Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. Analyzing population ratios in the star graph
may support the hypothesis that the transition from Nice to Lisbon does not redistribute
power more fairly.
To summarize our work with histograms, we utilize the Gini Index. Gini Index results for
the Council of Ministers are listed in Figure 11. We notice that relative to both population
26
Figure 10: Council of Ministers, Star, Population
and GDP, Banzhaf and Shapley show a significant decrease in the Gini Index meaning that
power is distributed more fairly in the transition from Nice to Lisbon. The star shows a less
dramatic shift, meaning that the effects of the transition are small. Interestingly, utilizing
the Gini Index, each power index depicts similar effects on fairness of power distribution
across population and GDP.
Nice Lisbon Change Nice Lisbon Change
Council of Ministers
Banzhaf 0.32 0.25 -0.07 0.38 0.32 -0.07
Shapley 0.26 0.09 -0.18 0.34 0.17 -0.17
Star Graph 0.11 0.10 -0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.01
Eurogroup
Banzhaf 0.31 0.35 0.04 0.35 0.38 0.03
Shapley 0.25 0.16 -0.09 0.28 0.20 -0.09
Star Graph 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.05
Complete Graph 0.53 0.51 -0.02 0.55 0.53 -0.02
POPULATION GDP
Gini Index for the CM and the EG under Nice and Lisbon
Figure 11: Gini Indices in the Council of Ministers
6.2 Conclusions of fairness (in terms of population and GDP)
In general, the large member states in the Council of Ministers are the most under-represented,
and there are more countries below the 1.0 benchmark (over-represented) than there are
above the benchmark (under-represented). The shift from Nice to Lisbon alleviates the bur-
den on the larger member states by giving them more representation, which all power indices
support. Further, aside from the GDP/Banzhaf ratios, the other ratios show an increase in
their mean toward the 1.0 mark as a result of the new treaty meaning that on average a
member state’s representation is closer to what it should be. Also, the ratios with Shapley
and Banzhaf see a decrease in dispersion, meaning that as a body there is less deviation
in fair representation. Banzhaf and Shapley show that the shift is more fair to individual
member states and the Council of Ministers as a whole. For the star graph, the conclusions
are less clear. But note that putting the two largest countries in the center gives them 25%
each regardless of the game so that they show no change in representation across the two
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treaties. Since our analysis on the star graph in practice “ignores” France and Germany,
the new treaty may be unfair to the rest of the member states. Yet, these two member
states were significantly under-represented according to the other two power indices, and
their increase in representation may validate the fairness of the move from Nice to Lisbon.
We noted that the voting procedures are directly determined by population, and the ratios
using population measures seem to best support the hypothesis as described above. However,
as GDP measures economic strength, and the EU is an economic institution, it seems that we
should analyze how fairly these measures distribute economic power. Why does the Council
of Ministers not have a criterion based on GDP? Perhaps, since population and GDP in the
EU are correlated, the population criterion is expected to encompass GDP. Yet, although
our results are not too dramatically different, the representation of power when looking at
GDP is notably different from the representation when looking at population. Particularly,
some member states such as the Netherlands find an unfair increase in under-representation
under the Treaty of Nice, as they were under-represented even prior to the new treaty.
Assuming a central role for France and Germany, the position value with the star graph
shows a much less dramatic difference in power distribution when compared to GDP in the
change to the Treaty of Lisbon. Likewise, the position value on the star graph gives some
indication that when compared to population, power distribution may be less fair under the
Treaty of Lisbon.
The Gini Index seems to support this analysis. Both Shapley and Banzhaf portray the
shift from Nice to Lisbon optimistically, whereas the results for the position value on the star
graph show little change. Furthermore, according to the Gini Index, the change in fairness
from Nice to Lisbon seems to be the same across population and GDP.
Since the European Union votes on a wide array of social issues, we are cautious in adding
too much emphasis on using GDP as it relates to power distribution. Although economic
issues are an important component of law-making within the EU, they are only a sector of
the larger pool of issues. As such, population may be the more appropriate metric within
the Council of Ministers. Still, we include analysis relative to GDP since the EU is described
as both a political and economic institution.
6.3 Efficiency in the Council of Ministers
The Treaty of Lisbon removes one of the criteria for a vote to pass in the Council of Ministers:
the qualified majority of designated weighted votes. This is what we have called v3. By
removing this criterion, the obvious effect is that counting votes will be easier. By changing
the quotas, however, the effect on power distribution is unclear.
Under the Treaty of Lisbon, in the Banzhaf and Shapley power indices, the four largest
member states gain power. Notably, Germany has the largest power shift and power gain,
especially in the Shapley index. Under Banzhaf, the four largest countries have 38% of voting
power versus 31% previously. Under Shapley the four largest countries have 48% of voting
power versus 35% previously. It could be argued that centralizing power in fewer member
states could make decision-making more efficient.
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Additionally, the number of winning coalitions increases significantly in the Treaty of
Lisbon. Under the Treaty of Nice, there are approximately 2.7 million winning coalitions,
which represents 2.03% of all possible 227 coalitions. On the other hand, under the Treaty
of Lisbon there are approximately 17.5 million winnning coalitions, which represents 23.06%
of all possible 227 coalitions. Therefore, the number of winning coalitions in the Treaty of
Lisbon is over six times the number of winning coalitions in the Treaty of Nice. More winning
coalitions should mean that it is easier for a measure to pass, making decision-making more
efficient in the Council of Ministers. The number of winning coalitions for a given game can
be found by substituting 1 for each variable in g, the function that represents all winning
coalitions. In other words, g(1, 1, ...1) gives the number of winning coalitions.
7 Analysis of Fairness and Efficiency in the Eurogroup
7.1 Fairness in the Eurogroup
A different story emerges when analyzing fairness in the Eurogroup. In fact, contrary to
the Council of Ministers, most of the power indices when compared to population and GDP
show an unfavorable shift in power under the Treaty of Lisbon. First, we compare GDP to
Shapley, Banzhaf, and the position value with the star graph:
1. The Shapley value shows that the fairness of shifts in power under the new treaty
are unclear. In the Eurogroup under the Treaty of Nice, four member states have
GDP/Shapley ratios above 1.0: France (1.449), Germany (1.881), Italy (2.018), and
the Netherlands (1.095), and interestingly these member states make up over 75% of
the Eurogroup’s GDP. Thus, 13 of the 17 member states in the Eurogroup make up
25% of total GDP and are over-represented. The Treaty of Nice distributes power
favorably to the smaller member states, and unfavorably to the large member states.
Moving from Nice to Lisbon, the mean for GDP/Shapley ratio increases from .64 to
.71, meaning that an average member state is closer to being represented appropriately.
Also, Belgium and Austria now have GDP/Shapley ratios above 1.0, meaning that 6
of the 17 member states are under-represented. However, the number of member
states in the 0-.25 range increases. Thus, the standard deviation shows little change.
Under Lisbon, surprisingly, the Netherlands (1.65) becomes the most under-represented
country!
2. The Banzhaf value, in general, shows that the transition from Nice to Lisbon is un-
favorable. Similar to the Shapley value, the GDP/Banzhaf ratios have the same four
large countries above 1.0 in the Treaty of Nice. Notably, Germany has a ratio above
2.0. The Banzhaf ratios have about the same mean, but a smaller standard deviation.
Interestingly, aside from France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, the Banzhaf ratios are
lower than the Shapley ratios.
Moving from Nice to Lisbon, Spain now has a ratio above 1.0 so that there are five
countries with GDP/Banzhaf ratios above 1.0. Of the previous four, only Germany’s
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Figure 12: Eurogroup, Shapley, GDP
ratio goes down, meaning that France, Italy, and the Netherlands are even more under-
represented. Still, however, Germany has the highest ratio. As with the Shapley
ratios, the GDP/Banzhaf ratios notice a mean increase in moving from Nice to Lisbon.
Unlike the Shapley ratios, however, the standard deviation increases as many of the
already over-represented member states become even more over-represented. From the
perspective of the larger countries, with respect to GDP, the shift from Nice to Lisbon
was unfavorable.
Figure 13: Eurogroup, Banzhaf, GDP
3. The position value value using the star graph also shows an unfavorable redistribution
of power under the Treaty of Lisbon. As with the Council of Ministers, we use the
position value on the star graph to give insight into the transition from the Treaty of
Nice to Lisbon if the two largest players, France and Germany, do not notice a shift in
power. We expect the game to especially change in the Eurogroup since France and
Germany consist of almost 50% of the population of the Eurogroup.
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In the Treaty of Nice, the GDP/star ratios have a much higher mean than the Banzhaf
and Shapley ratios relative to GDP, and also notice a lower standard deviation. The
range is smaller and there are also six member states with a ratio greater than 1.0.
With the ratios for France and Germany much lower, Italy and the Netherlands now
have the highest ratios.
The negative impacts in moving from Nice to Lisbon are much more dramatic in the
case of the star graph with respect to GDP. Every country besides Germany that had a
ratio above 1.0 becomes dramatically more under-represented. The range of the ratios
increases, and the number of member states at either extreme increases. The standard
deviation also dramatically increases. The mean does increase toward the 1.0 mark,
however.
Figure 14: Eurogroup, Star, GDP
Next, we compare population to Shapley, Banzhaf, and the position value on the star
graph:
1. The Shapley value shows that, relative to population, the Treaty of Lisbon more fairly
distributes power in the Eurogroup. When looking at the population/Shapley ratios
in the Eurogroup under the Treaty of Nice, there are also four countries with ratios
above 1.0: France (1.339), Germany (1.683), Italy (1.248), and Spain (1.011). Moving
from Nice to Lisbon, the mean for the population/Shapley ratios increase and the
standard deviations are almost identical. As shown in the histograms, the range of
ratios decreases and there is more central tendency toward 1.0. Under Lisbon, there
are now six under-represented member states, an increase from four under Nice. The
larger member states are now represented more fairly as they notice a decrease in their
ratios, and the number of member states below .25 remains at only four. Also, the
number of countries in the .25-.5 and .5-.75 ranges decrease significantly.
2. The Banzhaf value shows an unfavorable power shift. Looking at population/Banzhaf,
as with the Shapley ratios with population, the same four countries have ratios above
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Figure 15: Eurogroup, Shapley, Population
1.0 under Nice. Aside from those four countries, every country has a lower popula-
tion/Banzhaf ratio than population/Shapley. The population/Banzhaf mean is about
the same, but the ratios are more sporadic with a higher standard deviation. As seen
in the histograms, there are 4 countries in each of the ranges below .75, and there is
one country in each of the ranges above .75.
Moving from Nice to Lisbon, the range of ratios decreases. Also, the mean increases
from .65 to .69. But, the number of ratios in the range of 0-.25 and the range of 1.5-1.75
increases, which in turn increases the standard deviation. As with the Banzhaf/GDP
ratios, all of the large countries aside from Germany notice an increase in their ratio
and several smaller countries notice a decrease in their ratio.
Figure 16: Eurogroup, Banzhaf, Population
3. The position value on the star graph shows similar results to looking at the position
values on the star graph with respect to GDP, with an unfavorable shift in power. The
mean increases, but the standard deviation increases, the range of the ratios increases,
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and the under-represented member states become even more under-represented. An
interesting difference with population, however, is that there are only three countries
with ratios above 1.0 under Nice, but there are six countries above 1.0 under Lisbon.
Figure 17: Eurogroup, Star, Population
7.2 Fairness in the Eurogroup as Measured by the Position Value
on the Complete Graph
With the Eurogroup, we add a fourth power index: the position value on the complete
graph. As noted earlier, this index credits a player’s ability to facilitate communication
between “valuable” players in addition to a player’s ability to influence the outcome. The
complete graph is interesting in that in distributing power it takes away influence from the
weights and distributes power more evenly through the graph. We expect that we will notice
less dramatic power shifts and the range of the power index will be much smaller than that of
the Shapley, Banzhaf, and star graph. Since there is significant variation in the distribution
of population and GDP in the European Union, the ratios of population and GDP to the
position value on the complete graph will be much more pessimistic of the fairness of the
EU, and specifically the Eurogroup. Although the mean will be closer to 1.0, the range of
the ratios will be much greater and the standard deviation will be much greater compared to
the other power indices. Nonetheless, we can still utilize the position value on the complete
graph to provide insight into the changes in fairness as a result of the shift from Nice to
Lisbon.
For the GDP/complete ratios, in the shift from Nice to Lisbon, the mean decreases from
.79 to .78, which could imply that power is distributed unfairly as an average member states
has a ratio even farther from the 1.0 mark. However, the standard deviation decreases from
.98 to .90 and the range of ratios decreases. Also, more member states notice ratios closer
to the 1.0 line, even though there are still the same number of member states in the 0-.50
and .50-1.0 range. Aside from the Netherlands, all of the under-represented member states
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are represented more fairly under Lisbon with respect to GDP.
Figure 18: Eurogroup, Complete, GDP
With population, the results are less exciting. Looking at the histograms, aside from
Germany, every member state remains in the same .25 range as under the Treaty of Nice.
The mean decreases, which is mostly due to Germany’s dramatic decrease from 2.9 to 2.5.
In general, the other ratios notice little change, although every member state with a ratio
above 1.0 notices a decrease in their ratio.
Figure 19: Eurogroup, Complete, Population
7.3 Fairness in the Eurogroup as Measured by the Gini Index
The Gini Indices for the Eurogroup are displayed in Figure 20. In the Eurogroup, the results
using the Gini Index are unclear. Using the Banzhaf value, the Gini Index portrays the shift
from Nice to Lisbon as unfair as each notices an increase under both population and GDP.
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Using the Shapley Value, the Gini Index portrays the shift from Nice to Lisbon as fairer
as it notices a decrease with both population and GDP. Since the original Gini Indices for
the star graph are so close to 0 relative to the others, the increase may not be significant.
Further, the change for the complete graph seems relatively undramatic, showing that the
effect of the transition is small.
Nice Lisbon Change Nice Lisbon Change
Council of Ministers
Banzhaf 0.32 0.25 -0.07 0.38 0.32 -0.07
Shapley 0.26 0.09 -0.18 0.34 0.17 -0.17
Star Graph 0.11 0.10 -0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.01
Eurogroup
Banzhaf 0.31 0.35 0.04 0.35 0.38 0.03
Shapley 0.25 0.16 -0.09 0.28 0.20 -0.09
Star Graph 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.05
Complete Graph 0.53 0.51 -0.02 0.55 0.53 -0.02
POPULATION GDP
Gini Index for the CM and the EG under Nice and Lisbon
Figure 20: Gini Indices
7.4 Conclusions of Fairness (in terms of population and GDP)
Contrary to the Council of Ministers, the transition of power in the Eurogroup seems unfair
relative to GDP, according to the Banzhaf value and position value on the star graph.
The few over-represented countries generally become more over-represented and the most
under-represented countries notice little change. Although the mean typically increases, the
standard deviation increases as well, often substantially. The Shapley value and the position
value on the complete graph show an aggregrate unclear effect, with both favorable and
unfavorable effects under Lisbon.
Relative to population, again the Banzhaf and position value on the star graph show
unfavorable shifts in power. It is important to note, however, that the Shapley value shows
that the power shifts due to the Treaty of Lisbon are favorable and generally more fair.
The treaty grants much more power to the large players than the other indices, which is
reasonable given that they now constitute a much larger percentage of population and GDP.
We notice the same general effects as in the Council of Ministers with the mean increasing
and the range decreasing relative to both population and GDP. Finally, the position value
on the complete graph shows little aggregrate redistribution of power. Germany is the only
member state with a significant change in its ratio, and it is a favorable change.
As with the Council of Ministers, the Gini Index seems to support our analysis. Under
the Gini Index, Shapley portrays the shift optimistically, Banzhaf portrays the shift pes-
simistically, and the position value on both the star graph and the complete graph shows
little change. Furthermore, according to the Gini Index, the change in fairness from Nice
to Lisbon seems to be the same across population and GDP. We also note an interesting
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observation with the position value on the star graph. When the underlying graph is the
star graph, our central player(s) always have the same power, which in effect “removes” their
effect on power distribution. It is interesting that in both the Council of Ministers and the
Eurogroup, the effects for the position value on the star graph are minimal compared to the
effects for Banzhaf and Shapley. This may show that the aggregate effects of the shift in
treaties are mostly from effects toward France and Germany.
The big losers in the Eurogroup as a result of the shift seem to be the four large countries
which are France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. With respect to GDP, as with the Council of
Ministers, again Netherlands notices unfavorable representation.
In contrast to the Council of Ministers, the Eurogroup only votes on economic issues.
As such, GDP may be the more appropriate metric for comparing to power distribution. To
remain consistent, however, we include analysis for both population and GDP.
7.5 Efficiency in the Eurogroup
Unlike in the Council of Ministers, the Eurogroup does not notice the same centralization of
power when looking at the four largest member states of Germany, France, Italy, and Spain.
Banzhaf shows a decrease in voting power from 51% to 48% and the position value on the
star graph notices a decrease from 70% to 65%. The complete graph shows a subtle increase
in voting power from 33% to 35%. Shapley, in contrast, notices an increase in voting power
from 58% to 65%. Of course, there may be less incentive to centralize power with a much
smaller voting body.
Since the Eurogroup has a smaller player set, there are now 217 possible coalitions rather
than 227. Under the Treaty of Nice there are 7,628 winning coalitions, which represents
5.8% of the 131,072 possible coalitions. Under the Treaty of Lisbon there are 20,768 winning
coalitions, which represents 15.8% of the possible 131,072 possible coalitions. Thus, there
are more winning coalitions under the Treaty of Lisbon, which could make decision-making
more efficient.
8 Composition of Games to Include the European Par-
liament
Thus far, our paper has ignored the EU’s co-decision process where both the European
Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers must approve a measure in order for it to
pass. Because these two law-making bodies have disjoint player sets, we will use the idea of
composition of games, as described by Owen (1995), to analyze power distribution when
we include the EP. As earlier in the paper, in order to compute the Shapley and Banzhaf
values when we include the EP, we use the multilinear extension.
LetM1,M2, ...,Mn be n dispoint nonempty player sets and (w1,M1), (w2,M2), ..., (wn,Mn)
be simple games, and let (N, v) be a non-negative game (v(S) ≥ 0,∀S ⊆ N). Then the
v-composition of w1, w2, ..., wn. denoted u = v[w1, w2, ..., wn] is a game with player set
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M = ∪nj=1Mj defined by u(S) = v({j|wj(S ∪ Mj) = 1}) for S ⊆ M . The co-decision
process with the EP and Council of Ministers can be modelled as a v-composition of games
where v is the simple game on two players in which the only winning coalition is the one
containing both players, w1 is the game modelling voting in the Council of Ministers under
the Treaty of Lisbon, and w2 is the game modelling voting in the EP. M1 is the set containing
the 27 member states (the players in Council of Ministers), and M2 is the set containing the
751 MEP’s in the EP. To compute the multilinear extension, we need the following theorem
from Owen(1995):
Theorem 4 Let v be a nonnegative n-person game, let w1, w2 be simple games on disjoint
player sets, and let u = v[w1, w2]. Let h, f
(1), f (2) be the MLE’s of v, w1, w2, respectively, and
let f = (f1, f2). Then α = h ◦ f is the multilinear extension of u.
Let v = the simple game on two players in which the only winning coalition is the one
containing both players. Since its MLE is given by h(z1, z2) = z1z2, the theorem tells us
that the MLE α for the composite game including both the EP and the Council of Ministers
is found by simply multiplying the respective multilinear extensions (f (1) and f (2)) for the
Council of Ministers and the EP. We note that α is a function of 27 + 751 players represented
by variables x = (x1, x2, ..., x27) and y = (y1, y2, ..., y751): α = f
(1)(x)f (2)(y). To compute
the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value using the MLE, we need partial deriviatives of α:
αi(t, t, ..., t). For player i in the Council of Ministers, αi = f
(1)
i f
(2) since we take the partial
derivative of α with respect to x and f (2) is only in terms of y. Similarly, for player i in the
EP, αi = f
(1)f
(2)
i since we take the partial derivative of α with respect to y and f
(1) is only
in terms of x. In the preceding sections, we showed how to use the special function gi to
compute the function f
(1)
i (t, t, ..., t) for the Council of Ministers under the Treaty of Lisbon.
In the EP, f
(2)
i (t, t, ..., t) for the majority rules game on 751 players can be computed in
the same way. However, note that we also need to compute the functions f (1)(t, t, ..., t) and
f (2)(t, t, ..., t), which we can generate from the function g. Recall that g is the function given
by
g(x1, x2, ...xn) =
∑
S⊆N
(
∏
j∈S
xj)v(S) (38)
For the Council of Ministers, then f (1)(t, t, ..., t) = (1− t)ng(1)( t
1−t ,
t
1−t , ...
t
1−t), an exercise
that will be left for the reader. Similarly, for the EP, f (2)(t, t, ..., t) can be computed by using
g(2).
Example. Let (N,w1) be the simple majority rules game on 2a + 1 players with quota
a+ 1 and let (M,w2) be the simple majoirty rules game on 2b+ 1 players with quota b+ 1
where the player sets of each are disjoint. Let f (1)(x),f (2)(y) be the multilinear extensions
for w1 and w2 respectively. Let v be the composition game of w1 and w2 with multilinear
extension α(x, y) = f (1) · f (2).
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Since a player i only swings in w1 if the size of the coalition S ⊆ N − {i} is equal to a,
g
(1)
i (t, t, ...t) =
(
2a
a
)
ta. Relating g
(1)
i back to f
(1)
i (x), we find that f
(1)
i (t, t, ...t) =
(
2a
a
)
ta(1−t)a.
In addition, a coalition S is only winning in w2 if the size of the coalition S ⊆M is greater
than or equal to b, or s ≥ b+ 1. Thus, g(2)(t, t, ...t) = ∑2b+1j=b+1 (2b+1j )tj. Relating g(2) back to
f (2), we see that f (2)(t, t, ...t) =
∑2b+1
j=b+1
(
2b+1
j
)
tj(1− t)2b+1−j. Because α(x, y) = f (1) ·f (2), for
a player i ∈ N , we have αi = f (1)i · f (2). From the work in this example, for a player i ∈ N
αi =
(
2a
a
)
ta(1− t)a ·
2b+1∑
j=b+1
(
2b+ 1
j
)
tj(1− t)2b+1−j (39)
Previously in the paper we used gi(1, 1, ...1) to calculate the Banzhaf index, but from Owen,
we can also compute the un-normalized Banzhaf index for player i by using βi = fi(
1
2
, 1
2
, ...1
2
).
After some algebra, through this new method
βi =
(
2a
a
)
· 1
2
2a+1
(40)
To normalize the index for player i ∈ N , we need to divide by the total number of winning
coalitions in v. Summing g(1)(1, 1, ...1) and g(2)(1, 1, ...1), we compute the total number of
winning coalitions in v to be (2a + 1)
(
2a
a
)
(1
2
)2a+1 + (2b + 1)
(
2b
b
)
(1
2
)2b+1. Similarly, the un-
normalized Banzhaf index for a player i ∈M is (2b
b
) · 1
2
2b+1
. We note, importantly, that a is
the only variable in the numerator for a player in N and that b is the only variable in the
numerator for a player in M , whereas both a and b are in the denominator. As a result, as
a becomes large relative b, the Banzhaf value for a player in M decreases and approaches 0.
Conversely, the Banzhaf value for each player in N approaches 1
n
.
The result in this example gives us insight into the implications of using the Banzhaf index
for our analysis of the European Union when including the European Parliament. Since the
EP has significantly more players, we expect the players in the Council of Ministers to have
low Banzhaf values and in consequence the Council of Ministers will have significantly less
power relative to the EP. In fact, using the Banzhaf value, under the Treaty of Lisbon,
the Council of Ministers as a body has a Banzhaf value of 15% and the EP as a body
has a Banzhaf value of 85%. Since we have evidence to believe that this dispropportionate
distribution of power is directly resulting from the dispropportionate size of player sets for
the Council of Ministers and the EP, we will only focus on the Shapley value in our analysis
of the EU when including the EP.
Hoke (2012) repeats the above example using the Shapley value and proves that player
i ∈ N takes 1
2n
power and player i ∈ M takes 1
2m
power so that N receives 50% power and
M receives 50% power regardless of the disparity in size of player sets N and M . We prefer
the Shapley value in our analysis for this reason.
Applying our methodology of the composition of games to the EU, for the Shapley value
we find that the Council of Ministers takes 87% power and the EP takes 13%. Results for
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each individual country are listed in Appendix C. Similar to the Banzhaf index, we again
notice a disparity in power distribution across the two law-making bodies. To understand
why this disparity occurs, we inspect two scenarios using the composition of games that are
simple modifications to the quotas that define the formal voting procedures of the Council
of Ministers under the Treaty of Lisbon.
First, consider the Council of Ministers to be defined as the double intersection game
v′1 ∧ v′2 where v′1 = {620; 163, 129, ..., 1} and v′2 = {14; 1, 1, ..., 1}, which are simply the same
games as those in the Council of Ministers under Lisbon only now q′1 = 620 and q
′
2 = 14.
This game could also be thought of as the intersection game that defined the Council of
Ministers under Nice, without the majority game with designated weights. Repeating our
analysis using the composition of games, we find that the Council of Ministers now takes
80% power and the EP takes 20% power. From this exercise, it seems that lowering the
quotas toward 50% redistributes power back to the EP, which uses a quota of 50%.
Next, consider the Council of Ministers to be the double intersection game v′′1 ∧ v′′2 where
v′′1 = {500; 163, 129, ..., 1} and v′′2 = {14; 1, 1, ..., 1}, in which both games are simple majority
rules with quotas of 50%. In other words, these are v′′1 = v
′
1 with q
′′
1 = 14 and v
′′
2 = v
′
2
with q′′2 = 500. Under these new rules, the Council of Ministers receives 64% power and the
EP receives 36% power. Notice two implications from these results. One, again lowering
the quota of a game closer to 50% redistributes power back to the Parliament. Two, the
intersection of games in the Council of Ministers advantageously distributes power to the
Council even though both games have quotas of 50%. From these two realizations, the
structure of the relation in decision-making between the Council of Ministers and the EP
clearly favors the Council, despite the explicit goal of Lisbon to balance power between the
two.
9 Concluding Remarks on the Transition from Nice to
Lisbon
In this paper, we introduced the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value, the position value using
the star graph, and the position value using the complete graph. The position value requires
a graph, making power distribution dependent on more than just the weights of the game.
The star graph assumes restricted communication through central players, and the complete
graph assumes unrestricted communication. We utilized unanimity games and several func-
tions that relate back to the multilinear extension (MLE) in order to more easily compute
each of these power indices. Further, we described how to use generating functions in the
case of the intersection of weighted voting games.
Each of these power indices makes different underlying assumptions, so we would expect
them to return different results—especially in games as diverse as the Council of Ministers
and the Eurogroup. Still, although each power index is inherently different, their results
must have certain similarities that give us insight into the aggregate dynamics of the actual
law-making body, regardless of the assumptions.
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Particularly, we wanted to answer questions regarding the effects of the transition in
the European Union from the Treaty of Nice to the Treaty of Lisbon. As formal voting
procedures change, what happens to the distribution of power? More specifically, the EU
claims that the Treaty of Lisbon will be more efficient and fairer, so we asked if our analysis
supported these claims.
On the surface, dropping a criterion for a measure to pass makes counting votes easier
and thus the voting process more efficient. We probed deeper into game theory to obtain
more insight into this question. We counted the number of winning coalitions under both
Nice and Lisbon to see the change in probability that a given measure would pass. Moving
from Nice to Lisbon, in both the Council of Ministers and the Eurogroup, there are more
winning coalitions, meaning that the probability a measure will pass increases, and thus
decision-making becomes more efficient.
To assess the fairness of the shifts in power under Lisbon, we computed power indices
that we introduced in Sections 2-4 and compared them to two relevant metrics—population
and GDP—because the EU serves as an economic and political institution. For the Council
of Ministers, we computed the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value, and the position value using
the star graph, but omitted the position value on the complete graph due to computational
difficulties. Each of these indices portrayed the shift from Nice to Lisbon optimistically
with member states as a whole more fairly represented when compared to both population
and GDP. If we were to order the indices from most optimistic to least optimistic about
the transition, a reasonable ranking would be: Shapley, Banzhaf, position value on the star
graph. Our analysis was supported by the Gini Index, which interestingly showed similar
effects relative to population versus GDP in the transition from Nice to Lisbon, per power
index. Furthermore, it is interesting that the results for the star graph under the Gini
Index show little change when we remove the central players from our analysis of power
distribution. Perhaps, the aggregate effects of the shift in treaties are mostly from effects
toward France and Germany.
For the Eurogroup, we redid this analysis but supplemented it with the position value
using the complete graph since our player set was smaller. Contrastingly, in general the
indices when compared with population and GDP showed that for the Eurogroup the tran-
sition from Nice to Lisbon was unfavorable. The Shapley value and the position value on
the complete graph were more optimistic, but in general seemed to show that the aggregate
effect of the new treaty was unclear. The Gini Index supported our analysis for reasons
similar to those in our analysis of the Council of Ministers.
Within this analysis, we realized that although population and GDP are correlated, they
yield different results when looking at our ratios. Since the voting procedures in the Council
of Ministers and the Eurogroup are directly determined by population, we expected our
power indices to match population percentages best—and they did. In fact, in every power
index, the rankings of population percentages and power are the same. On the other hand,
this is not the case for GDP. As a result, countries with disproportionate population and
GDP percentages may notice different results when GDP and population are compared to
the power indices. Particularly, we found that the Netherlands noticed an unfavorable loss
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in power when compared to GDP. Although population may be more relevant to decision-
making in the Council of Ministers, whereas GDP may be more relevant to decision-making
in the Eurogroup, we included both metrics in analysis of each law-making body to remain
consistent.
Finally, we inspected the balance of power between the Council of Ministers and the
European Parliament under the Treaty of Lisbon by introducing the composition of games
since the two bodies have independent decision-making processes. We ignored the Parlia-
ment’s role under the Treaty of Nice because we were more interested in Lisbon’s claim to
strengthen Parliament through formalizing the co-decision process. Further, we argued that
since Parliament has significantly more voters than the Council of Ministers, the Banzhaf
value should not be used because it is not robust when one disjoint player set is significantly
larger than another. The Shapley index tells us that the Council of Ministers retains the
majority of power under Lisbon, although at first glance one may conclude that the two
should split power equally because each body must approve a measure in order for it to pass.
Exploring why the power is unevenly distributed, we discover that both the higher quotas
and the intersection of games in the Council of Ministers grants power more favorably to the
Council of Ministers using the Shapley value.
10 Limitations and Future Work
We note that since our analysis only uses formal voting procedures, our results for power
distributions likely have limitations. Voting members in an institution as large and so-
phisticated as the European Union are surely influenced by more than just formal voting
procedures. For example, in addition to formalizing the co-decision process for the Euro-
pean Parliament, Lisbon grants the EP voting power on many more issues, which may be
a significant increase in power not directly reflected from the formal voting procedures. At
worst, our results only apply to a narrowly focused perspective toward the EU, and are only
useful to this degree. Still, our methodology may be useful if it were adjusted to account
for more factors such as political affiliation or geographical location. At best, our results
give general insights into voting dynamics of the EU that may not be obvious at first glance.
Our paper offers a thorough analysis of power transition when making different underlying
assumptions about cooperation and communication among players.
Future work could include increasing the efficiency of computation in order to include
the complete graph analysis for the Council of Ministers. Further, an interesting institution
associated with the EU would be the European Central Bank. Although the ECB is not
directly affected by the Treaty of Lisbon, since it serves the Eurogroup, it may be another
area to utilize the complete graph with a smaller player set. Also, as we noted, a limitation
of this paper is its narrow focus on formal voting procedures. It may be interesting to look
at party influence in both the Council of Ministers and the EP. Furthermore, we alluded
to the use of blocking in our use of France and Germany as one central player. There may
be realistic blocking examples that better model the European Union such as blocking by
past voting alliances or by geographical region. Finally, we could simply introduce other
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well-known graphs such as the chain graph or bipartite graph to compute the position value
and compare the power distribution outcomes accordingly.
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Appendices
A Pseudocode to Compute Power Indices
Number of Winning Coalitions Calculator
[Input]: game(s) with quota(s)
Module[Generating Function]
*creates generating function gf =
∏n
i=1(1 + xy
wi) to represent all possible 2n coalitions
Module[Check Winning]
*returns the polynomial where all exponents on y are greater than or equal to the quota, or
the function g =
∏n
i=1(1 + xy
wi) =
∑2n
k=1
∑n
j=1 ckjx
kyj so that wS ≥ q for each coalition S
Module[Number Winning]
*since the coefficient on xkyj in this polynomial represents the number of subsets of size k
and weight j ≥ q, setting x = 1 and y = 1 returns the number of winning coalitions
Banzhaf Calculator (for a player i)
[Input]: game(s) with quota(s)
Module[Generating Function]
*creates generating function gfi =
∏
j 6=i(1 + xy
wj) to represent all possible 2n−1 coalitions
without player i
Module[Find Swings]
*returns the swings polynomial where all exponents on y are between q − wi and q − 1, or
gi =
∑2n−1
k=1
∑q−1
j=q−wi ckjx
kyj
Module[Find Banzhaf]
*since the coefficient on xkyj in this polynomial represents the number of subsets of size k
and weight q − wi ≥ j ≥ q − 1, setting x = 1 and y = 1 returns a player’s un-normalized
Banzhaf value because the un-normalized Banzhaf value for a player is simply the number
of its swing coalitions
Shapley Calculator (for a player i)
[Input]: game(s) with quota(s)
Module[Generating Function]
*creates generating function gfi =
∏
j 6=i(1 + xy
wj) to represent all possible 2n−1 coalitions
without player i
Module[Find Swings]
*returns the swings polynomial where all exponents on y are between q − wi and q − 1, or
gi =
∑2n−1
k=1
∑q−1
j=q−wi ckjx
kyj
Module[Find Shapley]
*sets x = t
1−t and multiplies the swing polynomial by (1−t)N−1 to get the function fi(t, t, ...t)
and integrates from 0 to 1 for each player i. This returns the Shapley value for player i
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Complete Graph Calculator (for a player i)
[Input]: game(s) with quota(s)
[Input]: complete graph position values table for a game of size N
Module[Generating Function]
*creates generating function gfi =
∏
j 6=i(1 + xy
wj) to represent all possible 2n−1 coalitions
without player i
Module[Find Swings]
*returns the swings polynomial where all exponents on y are between q − wi and q − 1, or
gi =
∑2n−1
k=1
∑q−1
j=q−wi ckjx
kyj
Module[Find player MLE(in)]
*sets x = t
1−t and multiplies the swing polynomial by (1−t)N−1 to get the function fi(t, t, ...t)
for each player i. Multiplying by t gives us f(t, t, ...t)in
Module[Find player MLE(out)]
*sets x = t
1−t and multiplies the winning polynomial by (1−t)N to get the function f(t, t, ...t)
for each player i. Subtracting the player MLE(in) from above gives the player MLE(out)
Module[player PV(in)]
*multiplies each coefficient cjk in MLE(in) by its respective value in the position value table
Module[player PV(out)]
*multiplies each coefficient cjk in MLE(out) by its respective value in the position value table
Module[Find PV]
*sums player PV(in) and player PV(out) to compute the position value for player i
Composition Calculator
[Input]: game(s)1 with quota
[Input]: game(s)2 with quota
Module[Generating Function1]
*creates generating function gf
(1)
i =
∏
j 6=i(1+xz
w
(1)
j ) to represent all possible 2n−1 coalitions
without player i
Module[Generating Function2]
*creates generating function gf
(2)
i =
∏
j 6=i(1+yz
w
(2)
j ) to represent all possible 2m−1 coalitions
without player i
Module[Find Swings1]
*returns the swings polynomial where all exponents on z are between q(1)−w(1)i and q(1)−1,
or g
(1)
i =
∑2n−1
k=1
∑q(1)−1
j=q(1)−w(1)i
ckjx
kzj
Module[Find Swings2]
*returns the swings polynomial where all exponents on z are between q(2)−w(2)i and q(2)−1,
or g
(2)
i =
∑2m−1
k=1
∑q(2)−1
j=q(2)−w(2)i
dkjy
kzj
Module[Find Shapley1]
*solve for f
(1)
i (t, t, ...t) f
(2)(t, t, ...t), multiply the two together, and integrate from 0 to 1 for
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i ∈ N
Module[Find Shapley2]
*solve for f (1)(t, t, ...t) f
(2)
i (t, t, ...t), multiply the two together, and integrate from 0 to 1 for
i ∈M
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Figure 21: EU map
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Country
GDP 2011            
(billions of Euro) Country
Population                     
(in thousands)
Germany $2,592.6 Germany 81,752
France $1,996.6 France 65,048
UK $1,747.1 UK 62,499
Italy $1,579.7 Italy 60,626
Spain $1,063.4 Spain 46,153
Netherlands $602.0 Poland 38,530
Sweden $387.6 Romania 21,414
Belgium $369.8 Netherlands 16,656
Poland $369.7 Greece 11,310
Austria $300.7 Belgium 11,001
Denmark $240.5 Portugal 10,572
Greece $208.5 Czech Rep 10,487
Finland $189.5 Hungary 9,986
Portugal $171.0 Sweden 9,416
Ireland $159.0 Austria 8,404
Czech Rep $156.2 Bulgaria 7,369
Romania $131.3 Denmark 5,561
Hungary $99.8 Slovakia 5,392
Slovakia $69.1 Finland 5,375
Luxem $42.6 Ireland 4,570
Bulgaria $38.5 Lithuania 3,053
Slovenia $36.2 Latvia 2,075
Lithuania $30.8 Slovenia 2,050
Latvia $20.2 Estonia 1,340
Cyprus $18.0 Cyprus 840
Estonia $16.0 Luxem 512
Malta $6.5 Malta 415
EU $12,642.8 EU 502,405
MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION RANKED BY GDP AND 
POPULATION
Figure 22: EU Countries Ranked by GDP and Population
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Country
GDP 2011                     
(billions of Euro) Country
Population                                  
(in thousands)
Germany $2,592.6 Germany 81,752
France $1,996.6 France 65,048
Italy $1,579.7 Italy 60,626
Spain $1,063.4 Spain 46,153
Netherlands $602.0 Netherlands 16,656
Belgium $369.8 Greece 11,310
Austria $300.7 Belgium 11,001
Greece $208.5 Portugal 10,572
Finland $189.5 Austria 8,404
Portugal $171.0 Slovakia 5,392
Ireland $159.0 Finland 5,375
Slovakia $69.1 Ireland 4,570
Luxembourg $42.6 Slovenia 2,050
Slovenia $36.2 Estonia 1,340
Cyprus $18.0 Cyprus 840
Estonia $16.0 Luxembourg 512
Malta $6.5 Malta 415
Eurogroup $9,421.2 Eurogroup 332,017
MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROGROUP RANKED BY GDP AND 
POPULATION
Figure 23: Eurogroup Countries Ranked by GDP and Population
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Country No. of MEPS
MEP Percent 
of Total 
MEP's
Percent GDP
Percent 
Population
Germany 96 12.78% 20.51% 16.27%
France 74 9.85% 15.79% 12.95%
Italy 73 9.72% 12.49% 12.07%
United Kingdom 73 9.72% 13.82% 12.44%
Spain 54 7.19% 8.41% 9.19%
Poland 51 6.79% 2.92% 7.67%
Romania 33 4.39% 1.04% 4.26%
Netherlands 26 3.46% 4.76% 3.32%
Belgium 22 2.93% 2.93% 2.19%
Czech Rep 22 2.93% 1.24% 2.09%
Greece 22 2.93% 1.65% 2.25%
Hungary 22 2.93% 0.79% 1.99%
Portugal 22 2.93% 1.35% 2.10%
Sweden 20 2.66% 3.07% 1.87%
Austria 19 2.53% 2.38% 1.67%
Bulgaria 18 2.40% 0.30% 1.47%
Denmark 13 1.73% 1.90% 1.11%
Finland 13 1.73% 1.50% 1.07%
Slovakia 13 1.73% 0.55% 1.07%
Ireland 12 1.60% 1.26% 0.91%
Lithuania 12 1.60% 0.24% 0.61%
Latvia 9 1.20% 0.16% 0.41%
Slovenia 8 1.07% 0.29% 0.41%
Cyprus 6 0.80% 0.14% 0.17%
Estonia 6 0.80% 0.13% 0.27%
Luxembourg 6 0.80% 0.34% 0.10%
Malta 6 0.80% 0.05% 0.08%
Total 751 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Figure 24: Parliament Ranked by Number of MEP’s
50
C Results
Country
Nice Lisbon Nice Lisbon Nice Lisbon
Germany 7.78% 11.34% 8.73% 15.31% 25.00% 25.00%
France 7.78% 9.06% 8.72% 11.45% 25.00% 25.00%
UK 7.78% 8.74% 8.69% 10.94% 5.29% 5.80%
Italy 7.78% 8.55% 8.69% 10.64% 5.29% 5.65%
Spain 7.42% 6.68% 8.01% 7.87% 4.88% 4.34%
Poland 7.42% 5.57% 7.99% 6.70% 4.88% 3.70%
Romania 4.26% 4.11% 3.99% 4.07% 2.41% 2.47%
Netherlands 3.97% 3.50% 3.67% 3.23% 2.23% 2.10%
Greece 3.68% 2.91% 3.40% 2.44% 2.05% 1.75%
Belgium 3.68% 2.85% 3.40% 2.36% 2.05% 1.71%
Czech Rep 3.68% 2.79% 3.40% 2.28% 2.05% 1.68%
Portugal 3.68% 2.79% 3.40% 2.28% 2.05% 1.68%
Hungary 3.68% 2.73% 3.40% 2.20% 2.05% 1.65%
Sweden 3.09% 2.67% 2.81% 2.13% 1.70% 1.61%
Austria 3.09% 2.55% 2.81% 1.97% 1.70% 1.54%
Bulgaria 3.09% 2.43% 2.81% 1.82% 1.70% 1.48%
Denmark 2.18% 2.20% 1.95% 1.51% 1.18% 1.34%
Finland 2.18% 2.20% 1.95% 1.51% 1.18% 1.34%
Slovakia 2.18% 2.20% 1.95% 1.51% 1.18% 1.34%
Ireland 2.18% 2.08% 1.95% 1.37% 1.18% 1.27%
Lithuania 2.18% 1.90% 1.95% 1.14% 1.18% 1.18%
Latvia 1.25% 1.78% 1.10% 0.99% 0.66% 1.11%
Slovenia 1.25% 1.78% 1.10% 0.99% 0.66% 1.11%
Estonia 1.25% 1.72% 1.10% 0.91% 0.66% 1.08%
Cyprus 1.25% 1.66% 1.10% 0.84% 0.66% 1.05%
Luxembourg 1.25% 1.60% 1.10% 0.77% 0.66% 1.01%
Malta 0.94% 1.60% 0.82% 0.77% 0.50% 1.01%
Shapley StarBanzhaf
Council of Ministers Power Indices
Figure 25: CM Power Indices
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Country
Nice Lisbon Nice Lisbon Nice Lisbon Nice Lisbon
Germany 13.01% 14.13% 14.63% 19.48% 25.00% 25.00% 8.31% 9.50%
France 13.01% 11.61% 14.63% 16.15% 25.00% 25.00% 8.31% 8.62%
Italy 13.01% 11.31% 14.63% 15.42% 10.40% 7.36% 8.31% 8.42%
Spain 12.36% 11.20% 13.75% 14.41% 9.48% 7.30% 8.08% 8.10%
Netherlands 6.25% 4.98% 5.84% 3.87% 4.02% 2.91% 5.83% 5.33%
Greece 5.82% 4.46% 5.22% 3.31% 3.68% 2.91% 5.66% 5.20%
Belgium 5.82% 4.43% 5.22% 3.28% 3.68% 2.91% 5.66% 5.19%
Portugal 5.82% 4.40% 5.22% 3.25% 3.68% 2.91% 5.66% 5.18%
Austria 4.96% 4.24% 4.21% 3.02% 3.09% 2.82% 5.40% 5.12%
Finland 3.44% 3.91% 2.88% 2.59% 2.09% 2.69% 5.05% 5.01%
Slovakia 3.44% 3.91% 2.88% 2.59% 2.09% 2.69% 5.05% 5.01%
Ireland 3.44% 3.85% 2.88% 2.46% 2.09% 2.68% 5.05% 4.98%
Slovenia 2.05% 3.60% 1.71% 2.13% 1.20% 2.58% 4.75% 4.89%
Estonia 2.05% 3.53% 1.71% 2.05% 1.20% 2.57% 4.75% 4.88%
Cyprus 2.05% 3.51% 1.71% 2.02% 1.20% 2.57% 4.75% 4.87%
Luxembourg 2.05% 3.48% 1.71% 1.99% 1.20% 2.55% 4.75% 4.86%
Malta 1.42% 3.45% 1.16% 1.95% 0.86% 2.54% 4.61% 4.85%
Banzhaf Shapley Star
Eurogroup Power Indices
Complete
Figure 26: EG Power Indices
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Country CM Power EP Power
Combined 
Power
Austria 1.61% 0.34% 1.95%
Belgium 1.96% 0.39% 2.35%
Bulgaria 1.47% 0.32% 1.79%
Cyprus 0.58% 0.11% 0.69%
Czech Rep 1.89% 0.39% 2.28%
Denmark 1.19% 0.23% 1.42%
Estonia 0.65% 0.11% 0.76%
Finland 1.19% 0.23% 1.42%
France 10.34% 1.31% 11.65%
Germany 13.95% 1.70% 15.65%
Greece 2.04% 0.39% 2.42%
Hungary 1.82% 0.39% 2.21%
Ireland 1.06% 0.21% 1.27%
Italy 9.60% 1.29% 10.89%
Latvia 0.72% 0.16% 0.88%
Lithuania 0.85% 0.21% 1.06%
Luxembourg 0.51% 0.11% 0.62%
Malta 0.51% 0.11% 0.62%
Netherlands 2.76% 0.46% 3.22%
Poland 5.99% 0.90% 6.90%
Portugal 1.89% 0.39% 2.28%
Romania 3.53% 0.58% 4.12%
Slovakia 1.19% 0.23% 1.42%
Slovenia 0.72% 0.14% 0.86%
Spain 7.04% 0.95% 7.99%
Sweden 1.75% 0.35% 2.11%
UK 9.87% 1.29% 11.16%
Total 86.72% 13.28% 100.00%
Figure 27: Council of Ministers and Parliament Results Under Lisbon
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